Praenotandum (Febr. 2022)
The following text I.6 has been written at a time that Habermas was less outspoken about the character of his philosophy. My thesis of 1982 was focused on what I have called a reconstruction of the conceptual framework of the human condition as I have seen it developing in Habermas’ writings of the period 1960-1980. My reading thereof concerns Habermas’ reconstruction of the foundational possibility-conditions of social interaction between humans.
The text is written in the same period as chapter I.5, but recently I have been
emendating it where needed, and I have added this praenotandum. It is as well a recapitulation as an improvement of the paragraphs 1 and 2 of chapter VI of my 1982 (dissertation pp. 183-203).
For my interpretation of Habermas’ position I needed to introduce an action-frame distinguishing between three interdependent contexts of analysis (Cf. Van Doorne,1982, chapter IV):
– context I – everyday social interaction
– context II – scientific interaction of human-/social-sciences
– context III – reconstruction of the foundational framework of social interaction
I consider Habermas’ reconstruction of the foundational possibility-conditions of social interaction between humans as a form of horizontal-analytical reconstruction. It belongs in my understanding in context III. It is the first form of reconstruction he has developed to argue in favor of a non-metaphysical foundation of his communication-based theory of society. A second, complementary form of reconstruction, is what he later calls vertical reconstruction. It is reconstructive-empirical. It intends to reconstruct the genealogical-historical development of specifically human social interaction. The two distinguished forms of reconstruction (reconstructive-analytical and reconstructive-empirical) are Habermas’ foundational approaches of a non-metaphysical philosophy. They are complementary ( In the subtitle of my dissertation I have called it reconstructive philosophy.)
In Habermas’ conception of a non-metaphysical philosophy the prescientific everyday praxis plays always a crucial role. Structural grounding features are inherent in all real lifeworld interactions, be they social or societal. And therewith is opened the way for a selfreflection of the sciences “that reaches beyond the limits of Methodology and Theory of science… and lays open in the prescientific Praxis the Sense Foundations of the scientific Theory-formation”, Nachmetaphysisches Denken,1988, ch. 3, Motive nachmetaphysisches Denken, p. 57. [My translation]
It is not possible to enter here into the complexities of this philosophical renewal. The best I can do is refer to a couple of clarifying texts: the already mentioned chapter 3 of Nachmetaphysisches Denken and ibid. chapter 4, par. 1: Das formalpragmatische Koncept der Lebenswelt and par.3: Gesellschaft als symbolisch strukturierte Lebenswelt. This conception is build around the concept of lifeworld as fundamental part of Habermas’ theory of communicative action. The lifeworld concept is an essential component thereof. This conception has crucial consequences for steps towards renewing our thinking about interdisciplinarity, that is, the conceptual design of a fundamental coherence between the different social sciences. Every societal feature is, according to Habermas’ view, indirectly related to previous interactions between actors. See also his ‘Von den Weltbildern zur Lebenswelt’, in: Nachmetaphysisches Denken II (2012 pp. 19-53). The most extensive reconstructive-empirical approach can be found in his recent voluminous publication: Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie, 2019, two volumes,918 and 820 pp. In vol. I, p.136-145 one can find a compact, very clarifying summary in keywords of the communication-theoretic background of his theory of society.
My reconstruction of I.6 is a horizontal reconstruction in context III, in the same sense as Habermas’ horizontal-analytical reconstruction. It is mainly build on Habermas’ use of cultural anthropological sources and on extensive analyses of developments in philosophy of language. It is my reconstruction of an early phase of his non-metaphysical pragmatic philosophy of communicative interaction. At that time vertical reconstruction was not yet on Habermas’ agenda. The sources of my interpretation are limited to that period, beside for a couple of recent emendations inspired by later publications of Habermas.
Nevertheless, the immense amount of Habermas’ publications since than, does not undermine my confidence that my reconstruction contributes to a correct understanding of a crucial cornerstone of his non-metaphysical theory of society with a key role for the lifeworld-concept. It is a central background concept of his theory of society. The modeling of this concept as designed in my text makes explicit its structural characteristics.
I.6 Reconstructing and Modeling Habermas’ conceptual Frame of social Interaction
With this chapter I have developed a well differentiated conceptual apparatus that allows to articulate the complexities of real life social interaction, to protect the riches of existential sides of our living together, and to foster counteracting the overpowering conceptual one-sideness characteristic for contemporary social sciences in the approach of social and societal interactions in today’s world. It is an attempt to offer an integrative conceptual foundation of social science and to make thereby a new start for interdisciplinarity. It is an attempt to create an explanatory model of reconstructive philosophy.
Habermas’s theory of society has given important incentives to the analysis of the relation between scientific and everyday problemsolving in several social-scientific disciplines. In this chapter I intend to show how the structuring conceptual network of his theory can be reconstructed with the use of mathematical means and how it connects the different conceptual layers of his theory. Step by step conceptual constructs are designed. The result thereof is a set of two systematically interlinked contexts and four models. One context focuses upon the general semantic structure underlying Habermas’s theory of society. The other context upon pragmatic elaborations of this categorical framework: one action-theoretic and the other lifeworld-theoretic. The two are pragmatic performance-oriented and context-specific. The performance-oriented models can be operationalized, being tested (heuristically, hermeneutically and/or experimentally) and made measurable in social-scientific disciplines, in order to assure their social/societal character and to foster interdisciplinary research in a new way.
1. Philosophical modeling and toolmaking
2. Starting my reconstruction: use of a mathematical model
3. Systematic semantic concept-formation
4. Design of context-bound pragmatic concepts
5. An outline of two levels of pragmatic concept-formation
6. Provisional conclusion
1. Philosophical modeling and toolmaking
What I am after in this chapter is the reconstruction of what Habermas in his theory of society considers to be the set of basic concepts and their framework, that is, their internal interconnection, which is necessary and sufficient to explain what constitutes a social interaction-situation in the first place, and to understand the performance conditions of social interactions in general . I understand it as his search for an explanatory model. It is a hypothetical reconstruction of the structural conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to be justified to characterize interactions as social interaction. I consider Habermas’ explicitely non-metaphysical approach as a renewing of foundational philosophical thinking.
1.1. two contexts and twice two levels of conceptual toolmaking.
To clarify the conceptual requirements and constraints implied in Habermas’ conception of social interaction, I will differentiate between two contexts of concept formation: (1) concept formation aimed at defining the general semantic content of social interaction, and (2) concept formation directed at defining and designing performative concepts that are appropriate to refer to social interaction with regard to its lifeworld conditions. Moreover I will distinguish within each of the two contexts two conceptual levels: first level concepts and second level concepts. As to the first context of concept formation, answering the question which basic semantic concepts are needed, I will distinguish the general concepts the interdependence of which constitutes the general content of social interaction (not yet empirically specified), and the constitutive components of an underlying model of primitive concepts . It answers the question: which components are minimally required to make it possible to use a model of primitive concepts to generate and define the general concepts of a theory of social interaction in accordance with the meaning and the coherence of the general concepts underlying Habermas’ theory of society.
I have assembled the set of structuring concepts of Habermas’ conception through a hermeneutical investigation of his writings. From this perspective they are prior to my interpretation of the positions and the relations of the formal model. However, from the perspective of reconstructive theory- formation and modeling, a minimal set of conceptual components has to be introduced that allows for the systematic generation and definition of the general structuring concepts. In my attempt to reconstruct a general frame of social interaction, meaning-components have to be introduced that can be considered as constitutive components for the general structuring concepts. Hereto I will derive these components from the general concepts used by Habermas through making explicit the assumptions involved in his conceptual reconstruction. They answer the question of the conditions of possibility of social interaction. It is in this sense that they are prior to the general concepts, and it is in this sense and only in this sense, that I may call the concepts used for the different components primitive concepts. Reason for me to name them first level concepts. The infrastructural model brings them together, and procures the conceptual means for the construction of the general conceptual model. In this sense I consider the concepts of the general conceptual model as second level concepts. I call them (a) the infrastructural model of meaning-components and (b) the general conceptual model of meaning–dimensions.
In a second context of concept formation the focus is on defining and designing concepts that are appropriate to refer to social interaction as contributing to a structural lifeworld constellation. Again two different, but complementary models need to be constructed, in order to make it possible to refer to empirically specified social phenomena. I call them performative models.
For the design of the performative models the conceptual means offered by the general conceptual model are used, but they are interpreted and specified such, that they are apt to refer to social phenomena in different material contexts of social interaction. In their conceptual interpretation as well as in their material reference the performative models are linked up contingently to a specific historical context.
That we need in the second context two models reflects the necessity to distinguish between social interaction between actors (individual or collective or institutional) and societal interaction between domains. I will call them the praxis-model, respectively the domain-model of social interaction. And again it is appropriate to consider the concepts of the praxis-model as first level concepts and the concepts introduced with the domain-model as second level concepts.
To do justice to the interconnection of the introduced concepts of the two levels I will make use of a mathematical tripolar interaction model. It results in two different, but interdependent models within each context and it assures the systematic conceptual interconnection as well within as in between the two contextes themselves.
Within the context of reconstructive-scientific research, the four models remain still very general. They are products of a theoretical reconstruction ,whereby the prefix ‘re’ refers to the assumed link with the empirical reality of social interaction in all its forms. I add immediately: a more or less indirect link, because it is only through testing the appropriateness of the specified interpretations of the two performative models, that the unifying concepts and the conceptual structure of the two constituent models can be made plausible. The testing occurs hermeneutically and/or heuristically and/or experimentally.
It is quite important to emphasize that in Habermas’ conception, social interaction in today’s society, as he understands it, is the outcome of an evolutionary process. One becomes aware of this looking at the long discussion Habermas has devoted to the evolutionary path along which has come about what he reconstructs as the constitutive features of social interaction in today’s posttraditional society (1981, t.II, ch.1 in his discussion of Mead).
2. Starting my reconstruction: use of a mathematical model
For a precise and differentiated reconstruction of social interaction as conceived by Habermas I have chosen to make use of the formal mathematical model of tripolar interaction as developed by Ruys. It makes the exposition of this paper more complex, but it is the price I am willing to pay. For with the help of this mathematical model it is possible to integrate unmistakably all the components and dimensions of Habermas’( (rather difficult to decipher) conceptual framework. The painstaking spelling out, with the help of the tripolar mathematical model, of the implications of the general concepts of Habermas’ pragmatic reconstruction of social interaction will prove to be fertile, I hope, for setting up well articulated and differentiated empirical research in the fields of the social sciences
It is possible to do so given the fact that for Habermas’ conception (human) social interaction is the central point of reference, and has to be understood as the interaction between three positions: two actor-positions and a mediating position, representing symbolic lifeworld-resources. I believe that it is important to use this tripolar model in order not to loose out of sight relevant semantic meaning-dimensions, meaning-components and meaning-aspects, as well as their pragmatic counterparts, that are implied in Habermas’ general conceptual frame of social interaction. This kind of reconstructive modeling and toolmaking can make visible the utter complexity of even the simplest everyday social interaction.
Crucial for my project of toolmaking in my attempt to reconstruct Habermas’ conceptual framework is the duality rule between points and lines by which the tripolar model is governed. The dual structure can be defined as structural homogeneity between two (conceptual) levels. This duality fits quite well the double approach of all social interaction by Habermas, respectively from a direct actor- and from an indirect lifeworld-perspective. Beyond that it is very important that the duality rule can be used as dynamic force of processes for renewing the concept of social interaction at successive levels of developmental complexity.
For now I just show two figures representing the dual sides of the formal tripolar model (Fig. 1a and 1b). In my exposition the models represented with Figure 1a and 1b are purely formal mathemathical models of tripolar interaction, that is, models with specific mathematical characteristics, but void of empirical content. Figure 1a represents the structural nexus of points and Fig. 1b the structural nexus of lines. As such, the models do not belong to the frame of social interaction I intend to design. They are just interactive models with duality between them as their characteristic feature.
Figure 1: the dual tripolar model of points (1a) and lines (1b)
The models acquire significance as representation of social interaction only by my Habermasian interpretation of the points (to be called positions) and the lines of the formal model (to be called dimensions). The interpretation that I propose in the following leads to a model of tripolar social interaction.
3. Systematic concept-formation of the basic semantic realm
3.1. the conceptual kernel of Habermas’ general theory of society with three interaction-perpectives
I start my philosophical interpretation of the formal models with Figure 2, showing the set of concepts that I have assembled in chapter I.6. Habermas has introduced the basic concepts constitutive for his theory of society in the early outlines of an ‘universal pragmatics’. Mainly in discussing general speech act categories, whereby speech act functions as the prototype of social interaction between humans. With the schema of Figure 2 I have extended the set of concepts one needs, to take explicitly in consideration the three perspectives that according to Habermas are required for the coming about of any social interaction: the double perspective of (minimally) two actors and a third lifeworld-perspective. Here lies the focus of the reconstructive-analytical part of his theory of society. And it is important to realize that language is for him crucial in the interplay of the three perspectives. For it is in his conception a basic resource for what he calls a posttraditional human society. It is in more recent work that Habermas has developed hypotheses about the major shift in human interaction brought about through the emergence of ‘grammatical’ language.
Figure 2: summary of the conceptual kernel
When I use to characterize the indirect perspective the same terms already used to characterize the twofold direct perspective I put them within quotation marks to indicate that they have a different meaning.
In the next pragraphs my reconstruction of Habermas’ framework sets out with the categories in the column reality relations of Figure 2, conjecturing that this is sufficient in order to be able to finally reproduce all basic Habermasian categories.
3.2 the seven basic semantic concepts of Habermas’ conceptual framework
In conformity with Habermas’s conception of a theory of society, I consider the following categories as basic and indispensable:
subjectivity (2x), objectivity(2x), normativity, intersubjectivity from the direct perspective, and the same categorical names for the indirect perspective. All doubly used names from the indirect perspective are this time signaled by quotation marks.
These are the names of what Habermas calls reality relations, that in his conception span the network of social interaction between actors as well as the network of interaction between lifeworld-conditions.
Given my tripolar reconstruction I have to add for the direct perspective the comprehensive category sociality and for the indirect perspective the comprehensive category reproduction of the lifeworld. The two terms refer to the integrating/integrated result from the direct, respectively the indirect perspective.
To avoid from the beginning misunderstandings, I have to introduce twice the categories of subjectivity and objectivity. This is due to the fact that social interaction between minimally two actors and lifeworld-resources, is the startingpoint and focus of Habermas’ reconstructive analysis. The semantic content of subjectivity and objectivity is in the two cases the same, but I have to duplicate in my model-construction the two mentioned categories.
As we will see, a pragmatic understanding of these two categories is for Habermas from the onset tied up with two independent empirical referents. This requires a twofold representation of the respective category. (I will mark them as + and – to indicate their difference and their initial independence). And in function of my intention to model the relations between the basic categories as a coherent configuration, I have as well to add the category social integration as comprehensive unifying categorie. That is how and why I can speak of altogether seven basic categories.
Figure 3a: hypothetical representation of the 7 general concepts by the formal model of lines articulated in conformity with Fig.1b
In order to take advantage of the characteristics of the tripolar model I have positioned in Figure 3a hypothetically the 7 basic categories along the lines of the tripolar model as shown with Fig.1b, calling them relations. And given the duality between lines and points I have conjecturally defined each relation as the product of three points of the dual model shown in Fig. 1a. It means that I conjecture that the numerically defined relations can be interpreted in terms of the interaction of each time three semantically defined positions. This leads to the following definition of the Habermasian categories introduced with Figure 3a and spelled out in Table 1.
Table 1: definition in semantic terms of the numerically defined lines
(100,101,001) = subjectivity+
(010,011,001) = subjectivity-
(100,110,010) = normativity
(100,111,011) = objectivity+
(010,111,101) = objectivity-
(110,111,001) = intersubjectivity
(110,101,011) = sociality
Interpreting the relations as representing meaning-dimensions I assume in addition that the positions represent meaning-components. Critical hereby is making the right choice of terms for each of the seven positions considered as representing constitutive elements of the seven relations. For at the one hand Ive to assure that the differentiation of the positions corresponds with the characteristic qualities that they have in the formal tripolar model, and at the other hand to assure that they do justice to the basic categories of Habermas.
3.3 giving names to the numerically defined positions in terms of semantic meaning-components
Quite urgent now to introduce names for the seven positions of Fig. 1a using terms that I esteem apt for this purpose and that, in my view, make a consistent semantic interpretation possible of the numerical definitions of the dimensions presented in Table 1. The names that I give to the seven numerical positions in order to represent semantic components, stick close to the terminology of Habermas, or at least intend to conform to his conception. Within this context I consider the terms used for each position as representing primitive categories. I present with Fig. 3b a tripolar model of positions in which I use for the seven meaning-components the terms that I introduce in Table 2. I will introduce and interpret each of the positions as a particular meaning-component.
Figure 3b: tripolar model of the seven positions interpreted as primitive meaning-components
Table 2: definition of the Habermasian basic concepts
–a = actor+
defined : constituent part of the three relations (adc)(age),(a,f,b),
interpreted and specified : an individual agent a (person, group, company, people…)
.a1 embody+his expression+ with linguistic lifeworld resources(a,d,c)
.a2 represent the linguistic embodiment- of b’s expressively embodied intentionality (a,g,e)
.a3 coordinate his intentional framing with b’s intentional framing (a,f,b)
–b = actor-
defined: constituent part of the three relations (b,e,c),(b,g,d),(b,f,a),
interpreted and specified: an individual agent b (person,group, company, people..)
.b1 embody expressively his intentionality with linguistic lifeworld-resources (b,e,c)
.b2 represent the linguistic embodiment of b’s expressively embodied intentionality (b,g,d) .b3 coordinate his intentionality with a’s intentionality (b,f,a)
–c =linguistic lifeworld resources
defined: constituent part of the three relations (c,d,a),(c,e,b),(c,g,f)
interpreted and specified: linguistic resources of a lifeworld
.c1 embed a’s embodying expressive intentionality (c,d,a)
.c2 embed b’s embodying expressive intentionality (c,e,b)
.c3 correlate embedding of a’s embodying representation of b’s expressive intentionality with b’s embodying representation of a’s expressive intentionality (c,g,f)
–d = linguistic embodiment+
defined : constituent part of the three relations (d,a,c),(d,g,b),(d,f,e),
interpreted and specified: linguistic embodiment
.d1 a’s embodying of expressive intentionality (d,a,c)
.d2 a’s representational embodying of b’s expressive intentionality (d,g,b)
.d3 coordination of a’s embodying expressive intentionality with b’s representational embodying of a’s embodying expressive intentionality (d,f,e)
–e = linguistic embodiment–
defined: constituent part of the three relations (e,b,c),(e,g,a),(e,f,d)
interpreted and specified: bodily symbolizing
.e1 a’s embodying expressive intentionality (e,b,c)
.e2 a’s representational embodying of b’s expressive intentionality (e,g,a)
.e3 coordination of b’s embodying expressive intentionality with a’s representational embodying of b’s expressive intentionality (e,f,d)
-f = joined (intentional) framing
defined: constituent part of the three relations (f,a,b),(f,d,e)(f,g,c )
interpreted and specified: joined intentional framing
.f1 joining the intentional frames of a and b
.f2 joining the mutually correlated representational embodiment+/- of intentionality of a and b with each others expressive embodiment of intentionality (f,d,e)
.f3 joining a’s and b’s linguistic embodying of expressive and representational intentionality with the embedding lifeworld resources (f,g,c)
–g social body
defined: constituent part of three meaning-dimensions: (g,d,b),(g,e,a)(g,f,c)
interpreted and specified : linguistic embodiment
.g1 a’s embodying representational intentionality with b’s embodied expressive intentionality (g,e,a)
.g2 b’s embodying representational intentionality with a’s embodied expressive intentionality (g,d,b)
.g3 common embedding of intentionality of a and b in linguistic lifeworld resources for the embodying of representational as well as of expressive intentionality (g,f,c)
3.4 semantic functions from the actor-perspective
It is now a good place to introduce and represent, conform the schema of Fig.2 column 4, the concepts Habermas uses to qualify the different linguistic functions of the structuring interaction of the seven meaning-components.
The functions represented with the following Fig. 3c are interlinking the infrastructural first level concepts (defining the meaning-components of the positions) of Fig.3b, with the general concepts (to be introduced to define the meaning-dimensions as second level concepts) conform Fig. 3d.
Fig. 3c: the intersubjective network of structuring semantic functions from the actor-perspective
Table 3: specifying the three quality-aspects of the 7 meaning-components
The ciphers 1, 2 and 3 added to the specifications of Table 3 indicate the three meaning-dimensions of which each component is a constituent part. For example: meaning-component a is a constituent part of the three meaning-dimensions adc, age, afb. And so on for each component as articulated in Table 3. The numbers refer to the three specific quality-aspects of each component.These specifications are effectuated on account of the semantic functions as represented in the above Fig.3c, and referred to in cursive in Table 3. The semantic functions are the following:
expression+/-, representation (+/-), (intentional) coordination, linguistic articulation (understood as common use of linguistic resources), and as comprehensive concept: sociality (that is: effectuating social integration).
Table 3: systematic definition of the basic conceptual meaning-dimensions as product of the structuring interaction of meaning-components
-interpreted and specified
.adc1 actor+, linguistic embodiment+ and linguistic lifeworld resources ( linguistic function of expression+)
.age2 linguistic embodiment+, social integration and linguistic embodiment- (linguistic function of representation+)
.afb3 actor+, actor- and (intentional) coordination (linguistic function of (intentional) coordination)
-interpreted and specified
.bec1 actor- , linguistic embodiment- and linguistic lifeworld resources (linguistic function of expression-)
.bga2 actor-, social integration and linguistic embodiment – ( linguistic function of representation-)
.bfa actor-, actor + and (intentional) coordination (linguistic function of (intentional) coordination )
-interpreted and specified
.fab1 (intentional) coordination, actor+ and actor – (linguistic function of joined intentional framing/(intentional) coordination)
.fgc2 (intentional) coordination, sociality and linguistic lifeworld resources (function of linguistic articulation)
.fde3 (intentional) coordination, linguistic embodiment+ and linguistic embodiment – ( linguistic function of representation+/-)
-interpreted and specified
.eag1 actor+, sociality and linguistic embodiment- (linguistic function of representation+)
.ebc2 actor-, linguistic embodiment- and linguistic lifeworld resources (linguistic function of expression-)
.efd3 linguistic embodiment-, (intentional) coordination and linguistic embodiment+ (linguistic function of sociality)
–interpreted and specified
.dgb1 actor-, sociality and linguistic embodiment+ ( linguistic function of representation-)
.dac2 actor+, linguistic embodiment+ and linguistic lifeworld resources ( linguistic function of expression+)
.dfe3 linguistic embodiment+, (intentional) coordination and linguistic embodiment- (linguistic function of sociality)
-interpreted and specified
.fgc1 (intentional) coordination, sociality and linguistic lifeworld resources (function of linguistic articulation)
.fab2 (intentional)coordination, actor+ and actor- ( linguistic function of (intentional) coordination)
.fde3 (intentional) coordination, linguistic embodiment+ and embodiment- (linguistic function of sociality)
-interpreted and specified
.gfc1 sociality, (intentional) coordination and linguistic lifeworld resources (linguistic function of social integration)
.gdb2 sociality, actor- and linguistic embodiment + (linguistic function of representation-)
.gae3 sociality , actor+ and linguistic embodiment- (linguistic function of representation+)
3.5 Generating systematically the semantic content of meaning-dimensions
I have conjecturally derived the semantic content of the seven introduced meaning-components from their being constituent parts of the seven relations of Fig.3a that are in the beginning only assumed to represent meaning-dimensions. It means that each relation now can be defined as meaning-dimension, that is, as the interactive product of three meaning-components, incorporating the introduced primitive concepts. Eg. actor+ a, linguistic embodiment+ d, linguistic lifeworld resources c, produces the concept of subjectivity+, and so on.
Given the duality between meaning-components and meaning-dimensions it thus becomes possible to articulate systematically the with Fig.3a hypothetically introduced semantic meaning of the seven meaning-dimensions. It means that I now can define systematically the second level concepts of the first context, hypothetically represented by the lines of Fig.3a, and systematically generated and represented with Fig. 3d. The structural interdependence of the meaning-dimensions is the outcome of the application of the duality rule and brings the concepts of the seven meaning-dimensions on a new level of conceptual complexity.
This new conceptual complexity is defined and articulated in Table 3. I refer to the lines for representing the meaning-dimensions as the product of the interaction of three primitive meaning-components. And I have anticipated the enriched meaning of the meaning-dimensions through referring to the three pertinent linguistic specifications of each of the meaning-components. I have the relevant linguistic functions already represented with Fig 3c.
Fig. 3d the meaning-dimensions as product of the structuring interaction of primitive meaning-components
The analyses of section 3 have led to the reconstruction of the second level of the first context of the semantic realm. The focus of this context is still from the actor-perspective, but from a different angle: not from the primitive concepts of the first semantic level, but this time from the general concepts of the second semantic level.
4. Design of context-bound pragmatic concepts: the other side of the conceptual realm
With the foregoing analyses I have completed the reconstruction of a first context with two levels of semantic concepts: primitive concepts and general concepts. After having made clear the sense and coherence of the basic semantic concepts of Habermas’ foundational approach it is now time to move on to the reconstruction of the second meaning-context, the context of the pragmatic realm, that is, from the perspective of the lifeworld. It is here that I have to ascertain that not will be overlooked that in Habermas’ conception of communicative action the systematic interlinking of semantics and pragmatics is crucial. . Only then and there do we get into the right pragmatic focus on social interaction as conceived by Habermas.
4.1 design of context-bound performative models
The meaning-components represented with Fig. 3b and the meaning-dimensions of which they are a constituent part (shown with Fig. 3d), determine together the first context of the semantic realm. It can be read as the result of the interaction of constituent meaning-components and meaning-dimensions from the actor-perspective and represents the social side of the semantic realm. Using again the duality rule makes it possible to introduce another reading of the general concepts of Fig. 3d accounting for their contribution to a new conceptual level. For there is another side to the semantic realm from the lifeworld perspective. I call it the second context of performative determination, the pragmatic societal side.
4.2 Transposition of Fig.3d into Fig.4a leading to the context of pragmatic reading of the general concepts
The focus goes now to the interaction of the meaning-dimensions themselves, to the structural coherence of the seven positions where the three meaning-dimensions of the new Fig. 4a intersect.
Fig.4a: new meaning-components as constituent structuring contributions to the pragmatic realm
The seven new components of Fig.4a concern structuring lifeworld contributions proper to the pragmatic realm. And they require explicating the specificity of the constituent elements of each new meaning-component at the intersection of three meaning-dimensions concerned, conform Table 4. Here I go back to the basic concepts of Habermas brought together in subsection 3.1 with Fig.2 (the indirect perspective), but now to explicate from the perspective of the lifeworld their pragmatic meaning and function. The meaning of the new components is represented with Fig. 4a. The addition in Table 4 of the numbers 1, 2 and 3 to the names of the components of Fig.4a specifies the three different meaning-aspects of each component as constituent lifeworld contribution to the pragmatic realm. Each contribution is defined in relation to its position on the intersection of three meaning-dimensions of the pragmatic realm (A until G) and the specification thereof conform Table 4. For each specific aspect of the components is given a first reference to its linguistic function in Table 4. The related specific linguistic functions will be elaborated in the following subsection 4.3.
For the characterization of the three specifications of each components determining the structural network of Fig. 4a I use in this pragmatic context the expression performative contributions to emphasize the lifeworld-making side of the resulting lifeworld dimensions of Fig. 4b. The interaction of the lifeworld dimensions of Fig.4b incorporates linguistically their functional action dynamics.
For this characterisation I refer again to the double structure of all human action (process and product) of Shotter’s enlightening use of this distinction (cf. note 4). These functional action dynamics are represented with Fig. 4b, and defined and specified in Table 5. Every meaning-component representing one of the general concepts of Fig.4a, is related to pragmatic functions. Again I am making use of the duality character of the tripolar model in my reconstructive conceptualization transposing Fig.4a into Fig. 4b which leads to a new meaning-enrichment. The transposition is this time moving from representing the general concepts of the semantic realm into representing the structuring concepts of the pragmatic realm with the reconstructive enrichement of concepts related to bringing about lifeworld conditions. This transposition is marking the transition from the semantic to the pragmatic realm. The enrichement leads to the lifeworld actionorientation of the defined linguistic functions of the new context of conceptualization represented with Fig. 4b.
Table 4: defining and specifying the meaning-components of Fig. 4a
–A = ‘subjectivity’+
-defined : the structuring lifeworld contribution to the pragmatic realm resulting from the intersection of the meaning-dimensions ADC,AGE,AFB
-interpreted and specified :
– ADC1 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘subjectivity’+ in terms of individuation/socialization+
– AGE2 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘objectivity’+ in terms of cultural reproduction+
– AFB3 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘subjectivity’+ and ‘subjectivity’- in terms of societal coordination
-B = ‘subjectivity’-
-defined : the structuring lifeworld contribution to the pragmatic realm resulting from the intersection of the meaning-dimensions BEC,BGD,BFA
-interpreted and specified :
– BEC1 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘subjectivity’- in terms of individuation/socialization-
– BGD2 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘objectivity’- in terms of cultural reproduction-
– BFA3 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘subjectivity’- and ‘subjectivity’+‘ in terms of societal coordination
–C = ‘intersubjectivity’
-defined : the structuring lifeworld contribution to the pragmatic realm resulting from the intersection of the three meaning-dimensions CEB,CDA,CGF
-interpreted and specified :
-CEB1 the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of resources for ‘subjectivity-’ and ‘0bjectivity’- in terms of individuation/socialization-
–CDA2 the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of resources for ‘subjectivity’+ and
‘objectivity’+ in terms of individuation/socialization+
-CGF3 the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of resources for ‘normativity’and ‘sociality’
–D = ‘objectivity’+
-defined: the structuring lifeworld contribution to the pragmatic realm resulting from the intersection of the three meaning-dimensions ADC,AGE,AFB
-interpreted and specified:
-ADC1 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘subjectivity’+ and ‘objectivity’+ in terms of individuation/socialization+
-AGE2 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘objectivity‘+ and ‘sociality’ in terms of cultural reproduction+
-AFB3 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘subjectivity’+ and ‘subjectivity’- in terms of societal coordination
–E = ‘objectivity’-
-defined: the structuring lifeworld contribution to the pragmatic realm resulting from the intersection of the three meaning-dimensions BEC,BGD,BFA
-interpreted and specified :
-BEC1 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘subjectivity’- and ‘objectivity’- in terms of individuation/socialization+
-BGD2 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘objectivity‘- and ‘sociality’ in terms of cultural reproduction-
-BFA3 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘subjectivity’- and ‘subjectivity’+ in terms of societal coordination
–F = ‘normativity ’
defined: the structuring lifeworld contribution to the pragmatic realm resulting from the intersection of the three meaning-dimensions FAB,FED,FGC
interpreted and specified:
-FAB1 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘subjectivity’+ and ‘subjectivity’- in terms of individuation/socialization+/-
-FGC2 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘sociality’ in terms of cultural reproduction+/-
-FDE3 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘objectivity’+ and of ‘objectivity’- in terms of ‘sociality’
–G = ‘sociality’
defined: the structuring contribution to the pragmatic realm resulting from the intersection of the three meaning-dimensions AGE,BGD,GFC
interpreted and specified :
GAE1 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘subjectivity’+ and ‘objectivity’- in terms of cultural reprodction+
-GBD2 = the aspect of performative linguistic articulation of ‘subjectivity’- and ‘objectivity’+ in terms of cultural reproduction-
-GCF3 = the aspect of performative articulation of ‘íntersubjectivity’ and ‘normativity’ in terms of ‘sociality’
4.3 expanding on the different pragmatic functions of the interaction pattern of the network of Fig.4b
Habermas has introduced for the linguistic functions of the differentiated components of ‘subjectivity’ (+/-), ‘objectivity’ (+/-), ‘normativity’, ‘intersubjectivity’ and ‘sociality’ (cf. subsection 3.1 Fig.2) new pragmatic performative concepts (already signaled in Table 4): individuation/socialization (+/-), cultural reproduction (+/-), societal coordination , ‘symbolic embodiment’ (to be referred to as linguistic articulation), and reproduction of the lifeworld as comprehensive concept (added for the purpose of my reconstruction). All these concepts explicate the dynamics of implied pragmatic categories, more generally: of the social/societal integration function of language use as such. Fig. 4b represents the network, Table 5 offers a more detailed characterization of the functional relationships.
Fig.4b: the functional pragmatic network of structural meaning-dimensions from the lifeworld perspective
Table 5: the network of structuring pragmatic functions from the lifeworld perspective 
For all the following conceptual determinations of the relations of Fig.4b I am speaking only in general terms about them as constituent contribution to new meaning-dimensions, manifesting relevant aspects of structuring action dynamics in the new context of pragmatic conceptualization. I consider them as structural network for the linguistic articulation within the pragmatic realm of performative interactions from the actor-perspective, and indirectly from the lifeworld perspective to interactions between domains within today’s enlarged pragmatic realm.
–ADC resp. BEC: individuation/socialization+/- 
defined: ADC,AGE,AFB resp. BEC,BGD,BFA-
interpreted and specified:
-ADC1 resp.BEC1: the structuring aspect of the function of individuation/socialization+/- in the process of which the ‘subjectivity+’ of A, resp. the ‘subjectivity’- of B has been activated and developed in terms of its own internal world, its own identity, having marked its way into renewing interaction with the ‘subjectivity’- of B, resp. the ‘subjectivity’+ of A
-AGE2 resp.BGD3: the structuring aspect of the function of cultural reproduction+/- through which the ‘subjectivity’+ of A resp. the ‘subjectivity’- of B has been represented as ‘objectivity’ +/- through responding to it. It means that their cultural reproduction+/-, in terms of linguistic representational exchange, has led for them to the construct of a matching objectified world 
-AFB3 resp. BFA3: the structuring aspect of the function of societal coordination: the actors A and B have been involved in an interaction-situation and have witnessed an intersubjective engagement with regard to each other’s normative framing.
(They only get their pragmatic normative impact for the individuation/socialization process+/- and for the process of cultural reproduction+/-through drawing up provided linguistically binding resources, see C.)
-C: linguistic articulation 
interpreted and specified:
-CAD1 resp. CBE2 the structuring aspect of the function of linguistic articulation in the use of linguistic resources shared by A and B in the actual process of individuation/socialization+/- and of cultural reproduction+/-
-CFG3 the structuring aspect of the function of reproduction of the lifeworld resulting from the shared societal coordination of linguistic articulation in the processes of individuation/socialization+/- and of cultural reproduction-/+. It is only through having drawn up common linguistically binding resources for ‘subjectivity’+/- and ‘objectivity’-/+ that reproduction of the lifeworld between the counterparts has reached integration.
-D resp. E: cultural reproduction+/-
defined DAC,DGB,DFE, resp. EBC,EGA,EFD
interpreted and specified:
-DAC1, resp. EBC1 the structuring aspect of the function of individuation/socialization+/- such that this function has been effectuated using the same, appropriately corresponding linguistic resources for expressing ‘subjectivity’ +/- and for representing ‘objectivity’+/-
-DGB2 resp. EGA2 the structuring aspect of the function of cultural reproduction+/- such that this function has led to the representation of ‘subjectivity-/+ in a way whereby the use of linguistic resources is complementary to the match-making function of reproduction of a social lifeworld
-DFE3 resp.EFD3 the structuring aspect of the function of normative coordination such that the processes of individuation/socialization+/- have come about in a way whereby the linguistic articulation of mindframes matches effectively the function of cultural reproduction-/+
-FAB: societal coordination
interpreted and specified :
-FAB1 the structuring aspect of the function of societal coordination of the expressive individuation/socialization processes+/-
-FDE2 the structuring aspect of the function of societal coordination of the cultural reproduction+/- and of the expressive side of individuation/socialization processes-/+
-FGC3 the structuring aspect of the function of societal coordination for the process of linguistic articulation of the individuation/socialization processes+/- as well as for the cultural reproduction processes+/-
-GDE: reproduction of the lifeworld 
interpreted, specified and referred to:
-GFC1 the structuring aspect of the function of reproduction of the lifeworld regarding the processes of societal coordination of mutual commitment of A and B and of the processes of providing appropriate linguistic resources
-GAE2 the structuring aspect of the function of reproduction of the lifeworld regarding the processes of matching cultural reproduction+ and the expressive individuation/socialization processes-
-GBD3 the structuring aspect of the function of reproduction of the lifeworld regarding the process of matching cultural reproduction- and the expressive individuation/socialization processes+
5. An outline of two levels of pragmatic concept-formation
5.1 from only general to concretized pragmatic concepts
In this subparagraph I am expanding on the transition of the semantic context to the first level of the context of pragmatic conceptualization. Up until now the fact has been neglected that the language tools that Habermas uses have a primarily pragmatic significance. His theory is build on performative concepts. For in his theory of society language-tools not only function as semantic explications of content-meaning, they are pragmatic as well through their lifeworld-making capacity. It means that the basic concepts of Habermas’ theory of society not only have to be analyzed as to their semantic meaning and function, they reveal at the same time a pragmatic meaning and function through their being related to characteristics of actual lifeworld conditions and situations. They signify that capacities of engagement ( the actor side) have to be explicated through their reference to empirically discernable lifeworld-conditions (the societal side).
This is the ‘locus’ where Habermas’ concepts of his praxis-model originate. It offers the possibility to bring together the riches of semantic concept-formation with a pragmatic context of concept-formation where concepts are referring to characteristics of situational lifeworld conditions. Only then and there we get into the right pragmatic focus on social interaction as conceived by Habermas. With increasing complexity of societies, social interrelations between actors have tended to develop into specific interaction-patterns with some or a high degree of independence. We live in a society where it is common to distinguish a number of different sectors or domains (of science, politics, law, economics, sports and so on). And the empirically and institutionally discernible boundaries of the different domains have a more or less heavy impact on the appearance of social practices and on the outline of societal dimensions. This factual impact should be accounted for as part of reconstructive conceptualization.
From this viewpoint there is regarding today’s society a second level of pragmatic conceptualization needed. Habermas speaks about it in terms of the need to design a domain-model. In his analyses are the concepts related to this purpose concepts that he has chosen in a longstanding discussion with the classical authors of sociology, Durkheim, Weber, Mead and Parsons. These authors have developped approaches in which the formation of philosophical concepts was closely connected with the formation of the basic concepts of emerging social sciences. These authors considered the concepts that they were introducing as apt tools for delineating and articulating the societal domains that they had seen developing and becoming institutionalized in the course of development of modern (western) societies. As such those concepts are dependent on, and marked by the highly different societal settings for which they have been designed. It means that the choice of appropriate concepts was inevitably tied up with empirical interpretations and specifications. Habermas’ approach is in line with this conception.
Therefore I can not start immediately with analyses of concrete pragmatic interactions without having looked at this important distinction that Habermas makes with regard to the pragmatic focus on todays lifeworld conditions. I have to introduce two new models appropriate for the two to be distinguished levels of conceptualization. According to him we need two models to account for the two levels of performativ interactions: the level of a praxis model from the actor-perspective concerning real lifeworld social interactions, and the level of a complementary model, a domain-model, from the perspective of existing real lifeworld societal interactions. Social interactions between actors come about inside of the playing field of a comprehensive binary (social and societal) actual lifeworld, that itself is in permanent exchange with reproduced former lifeworlds and a non-social environment. Ongoing social interactions are contemporary practices materializing in the process of renewing the lifeworld constellation.
5.2 designing the praxis-model
Habermas’ praxis-model is about social practices, that is practices between participants who create real life interaction-situations and engage into them. With my reconstruction of this first pragmatic model I intend to represent the conceptual structure that according to Habermas is inherent in all real lifeworld interactions. In this sense is the conceptual core of the praxis-model structurally equivalent with the semantic structure of Fig. 3c, but now with the requirment to take into account the contemporary impact of the factual lifeworld conditions, its pragmatic side.
The following analyses are build upon this basic assumption, but given its interdependence with empirical phenomena, in a more concrete form than the abstract structure of the preceding semantic analyses. It means that the praxis-model belongs to another level of conceptualization than the semantic model.
As we have explained above regarding the tranposition from the conceptual level of semantic reconstruction (represented with Fig 4a) to the level of the pragmatic conceptualization via the linguistic functions of Fig 4b with their implied pragmatic significance is made possible due to the duality rule.
It is important to realize that this conceptual empirically informed structure is nevertheless a construct. It means among other things that it is a fallible proposition that needs to be corroborated in empirical and historical-genealogical research. It means also that the here offered models have to be concretized through measuring and counting data of respective occurence and weight of aspects (21!), components and dimensions. All of them are conditioned by the impact of historical constellations. Without these additional approaches and considerations remain the two models to be discussed, void of relevance for today’s factual lifeworlds.
As part of my reconstructiv-analytical conjectures, I am introducing now the components of the Habermasian praxis-model to construct and define a first level of pragmatic significance. To reconstruct in line with Habermas’ conception the pragmatic concepts of social practices, I will, as before, remain as close as possible to his terminology. I follow him through mainly using his conceptual choices. The praxis-model of social interaction demands in Habermas’ theory of society the differentiation between the following practices by the actors involved:
practices of individuation/socialization+/-, practices of joined normative framing, practices of linguistic embodiment (+/-), practices of providing linguistically embedded binding resources, and (as comprehensive concept) practices of social integration.
The components of Fig. 5a represent the result of the interaction of each time three pragmatic meaning-dimensions of Fig.4b, that is, of the linguistic functions, e.g. the linguistic functions of individuation/socialization+, cultural reproduction+, and societal coordination. And so on. Again I have made use of the duality rule to make this move. This operation asks for gaining new ‘enriched’ concepts and new names for the seven positions, by the fact of adding references to empirical conditions. Only then are the new positions appropriate to represent concrete social practices, the social side of Fig. 5a. In Table 6 I will define the different social practices and specify the functional three aspects of the newly introduced concepts.
For the meaning-components on the positions of Fig. 5a I have chosen as codes double alphabethical majuscules AA until GG to indicate the higher conceptual level of this part of my reconstruction.
Figure 5a: the tripolar praxis-model: design of the structural coherence of the differentiated social practices .
Table 6 introduces the seven new conceptual components. It means naming, defining and specifying them as well as referring, where needed at this place, to empirically discernable phenomena. In fact naming means re–naming in pragmatic terms the higher level components of Fig. 5a that result from the interaction of the pragmatic meaning-dimensions of Fig. 4b. The concepts of Fig. 5a represent concrete empirical interactions from the actor-perspective within the pragmatic performative context.
Table 6: social practices defined and specified
AA resp. BB practices of individuation/socialization+/-
-defined: ADC,AGE,AFB resp. BEC,BGD, BFA
-interpreted, specified and referred to:
-ADC1 resp. BEC1 : practices of individuation/socialization+/- by which actors in the face of other actors activate and develop their internal world (their subjective identity), marking their own way in factual interaction situations.
-AGE2 resp.BGD2: practices of cultural reproduction+/- by which actors reproduce through responding to it, the expressive linguistic embodiment of each other. It means that their exchange of cultural reproduction practices+/- leads for them to the construction of a matching objectified world. This world is the result of overlapping, ‘mirrorred’ perspectives, and by the same effect it makes this objective world in principle ambiguous 
-AFB3 resp.BFA3: practices of normative framing whereby the actors involved in an interaction-situation witness of an intersubjective engagement with regard to each other’s normative framing.
–CC practices of providing linguistically embedded binding resources
interpreted, specified and referred to:
-CDA1 providing binding resources for the expressive practices of individuation/socialization+
-CEB2 providing binding resources for the expressive practices of individuation/socialization-
-CGF3 providing binding resources for the expressive, representational and normativ practices of ADC1, AGE2, AFB3 and of BEC1, BGA2 and BFA3 through sharing linguistically embodied and embedded binding mindframes. It is only through drawing upon common linguistically binding resources that social interaction between the counterparts finds its ground.
–reference: e.g. when actor AA expresses his mindframe to actor BB, he differentiates between ‘you’ and ‘I’ following the standard rules for pronouns common to their language, and so does actor BB1 in answering. Assumption: they are both able to speak English. (Compare also the quote of Tomasello in footnote ).
-DD, resp. EE practices of linguistic embodiment+/- 
-defined DAC,DGB, DFE, resp. EBC, EGA,EFD
-interpreted, specified and referring to
-DAC1, resp. EBC1: linguistic embodiment of expressive practices of AA, resp. BB, such that the expressive practices of actor AA, resp. BB are tuned in with the embodiment practices of BB, resp. AA and with the practices of social integration GG.
-DGB2, resp. EGA2 linguistic embodiment of representational practices DGB, resp. EGA in response to the linguistic embodiment of expressive practices of AA, resp.of BB, whereby the use of linguistic means is complementary due to the matching practices of social integration GG
-DFE3, resp.EFD3 linguistic embodiment of mindframes DFE, resp. EFD such that they match effectively the practices of linguistic embodiment DD as well as the practices of linguistic embodiment EE.
–reference: each language has its own rules, phonological, syntactical, grammatical and so on. Within the reach of every language there can be tremendous divergences as to pronunciation, choice of wordings etc. Quite often there are local sub-communities with their own historically developed way of thinking and speaking. Although they have in common that they speak e.g. English, it might nevertheless only be or become their common resource when the practices of linguistic embodiment by the actors are attuned conform to the three specified ways. This is the more so the case for social exchange in different languages and across different cultures.
-FF practices of joined normative framing
interpreted, specified and referring to:
-FAB1 normative coordination of individuation/socialization practices +/-
-FDE2 normative coordination of practices of cultural reproduction +/-
-FGC3 normative coordination of practices of providing linguistic resources for embedding the embodiment of expressive practices of AA and BB as well as the representational practices AA and BB
–reference: For reaching mutual understanding the registers used for the practices of linguistic embodiment of expressing internal matters ( about believing, thinking, dreaming…), and linguistic embodiment representing the external factual situation ( the costs of living, outlook etc.) have to be contradistinguished in a similar way by the actors involved, otherwise there will not come about a matching, intersubjectively communicable and binding social world.
-GG practices of social integration
interpreted and specified:
-GFC1 practices of joined normative framing of the intentional normative commitment AA and BB
-GAE2 practices of matching representational linguistic embodiment DD and EE
-GBD3 practices of providing linguistic resources for shared binding expressive and representational practices of AA and BB
Integration through the interplay of practices of joined normative framing, of matching practices of linguistic embodiment thereof and of practices of providing shared binding resources for linguistically embedding it. That is, guaranteeing the communicative character of social interaction between humans.
Every typically human social interaction situation can only be considered as such when it is possible to show empirically how it integrates the six other practices; and only when it is possible to discern them, each with their three differentiated dimensional aspects; and only when it is possible to measure and weigh through apt research-designs for each aspect, the different contributions to the coming about of that situation.
Today’s dominant existing social disciplines have lost adequately responding to this complexity of real life social interactions.
5.3 interlinking structuring social practices and structural societal deposits
In Habermas’s conception the theoretical approach focused on interactions between actors, that is: social practices, has to be complemented in today’s (western) societies by a theoretical approach focused on interactions between societal phenomena. Every societal phenomenon (be it an institution or a domain or a sector) is the depositing outcome of the confrontation of foregoing interactions between actors with the impact of established lifeworld conditions and situations. Social practices understood in this way already prefigure the possibility to recognize, designate and delineate concrete, more or less institutionalized, particular sectors or domains. In the sense of materializing explicate social practices the implied pragmatic dynamics of concepts. Or to put it in more general terms: they manifest the lifeworld-making function of language as such. With increasing complexity of societies, social interrelations between actors tend to develop into specific interaction-patterns with some or a high degree of independence. We live in a society where it is common to distinguish a number of different sectors or domains (of science, politics, law, economics, sports and so on). And the empirically and institutionally discernible boundaries of the different domains have a more or less heavy impact on the appearance of social practices and on the outline of societal dimensions. I call the impact deposits. This factual impact should be accounted for.
From this viewpoint there is regarding today’s society a second level of pragmatic conceptualization needed. Habermas speaks about it in terms of the need to design a domain-model.
The first sections of my reconstruction in this chapter I.7 were focused on the complexity of the grounding conceptual structure with seven different components, dimensions and alltogether seven times three relevant aspects . They offer a guideline for empirical research, but the respective occurrence and weight of aspects, components and dimensions are conditioned by the impact of historical constellations. They only can be laid open in processes of empirical research. The domain-model of Habermas is inspired by the before mentioned classical authors. That could be seen already in the case of the concepts he has introduced for the functional linguistic meaning-dimensions of Fig.4b preparing the first pragmatic model. Fig. 4b can be considered as the infrastructure of the praxis-model represented with Fig. 5a.
Thanks to the duality rule I can make now the transposition of the meaning-components of Fig. 5a into meaning-dimensions represented with the domain-model of Fig. 5b. Thus it leads to the second level of pragmatic concept-construction represented with the model of Fig.5b and defined in Table 8. It is the ultimate step in my analytical reconstruction.
With this step I arrive at the definition and specification of the fully explicated pragmatic significance of the structural delineations of domains. These delineations are in Habermas’conception related to the way in which all domain-related concepts ultimately are rooted in the basic conceptual structure of the communicative interaction of actors.
However, the domain-model does not show under what kind of empirical historical conditions the structural basic delineations have become effectuated. It is only through scrutinizing the developmental stages of the implementation of the structural features of social integration that we get insight into the actual, factual pragmatic ‘status quo’. And through searching how the implementation process has given form to the foundational features, thereby determining the relative performative strength and weight of the materialized concepts at stake.
5.4. the domain-model
Fig. 5b represents the domain-model and it will be defined in Table 7. To make the transition from the praxismodel of Fig.5a to the domain-model of Fig.5b, using the duality rule again, I represent the seven domain-concepts on the lines of Fig.5b, that is, as meaning-dimensions. This transition to again a higher conceptual level is marked through triple alphabethical majuscules for the new dimensions. I consider each meaning-dimension as a compound with three specifying aspects. The letter d. The letter d. used for the naming of the dimensions stands as shorthand for domain.
Fig.5b. the domain-model
Table 7: definition and specification of the seven domains
– AAA,DDD, CCC
–defined: domain of individuation/socialization+
-interpreted, specified and referred to :
-AAAFFFBBB1 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of individuation/socialization+ on the domains of normative linguistic articulation and of cultural reproduction+
-DDDGGGBBB2 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of individuation/socialization+ on the domains of cultural reproduction+ and the domain of reproduction of the lifeworld
-CCC,GGG,FFF3 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of individuation/socialization+ on the domain of providing linguistically embedded lifeworld resources and of the domain of individuation/socialization-
In today’s western societies our educational and healthcare institutions can be referred to as dominant institutionalized sectors pertaining to this domain. The specifications 1,2,3 refer to the possibility that regarding the overall effect of the domain of societal identification/socialization+ on real life situations ( that is on the sum total of factual societal interactions) may manifest an unbalanced stretch and weight of the aspect AAAFFFBBB1 in comparison with the stretch and weight of the aspects DDDGGGEEE2 or CCCGGGFFF3. And other unbalances may be detected as well as a consequence of the overall input of the other domain of individuation/socialization-, with its own unbalances. And so on for the impact on each other of all the other constitutive domains of a given modern society.
defined : domain of individuation/socialization-
–interpreted and specified:
-BBBFFFAAA the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of individuation/socialization- on the domain of normative linguistic articulation and on the domain of cultural reproduction-
-BBBGGGDDD2 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of individuation/socialization- on the domain of cultural reproduction- and on the domain of reproduction of the lifeworld
-BBBEEECCC3 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of individuation/socialization- on the domain of providing linguistically embedded lifeworld resources and on the domain of individuation/socialization+
–reference: see under AAADDDCCC
–defined: domain of normative linguistic articulation
-interpreted, specified and referred to:
–FFFGGGCCC1 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of normative linguistic articulation on the domain of individuation/socialization+ and on the domain of individuation/socialization-
-FFFDDDEEE2 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of normative linguistic articulation on the domain of cultural reproduction+ and the domain of cultural reproduction-
-FFFGGGCCC3 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of normative linguistic articulation on the domain of providing linguistically embedded lifeworld resources and on the domain of reproduction of the lifeworld
In our society press agencies, broadcasting institutions and the whole complex of the worldwide web are good examples of references for this domain.
–defined: domain of cultural reproduction+
–interpreted, specified and referred to:
-AAAGGGEEE1 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of cultural reproduction+ on the domain of normative linguistic articulation and on the domain of individuation/socialization+
-AAAEEEGGG the aspect of structural deposits of cultural reproduction+ on the domain of individuation/socialization- and on the domain of reproduction of the lifeworld
-EEEFFFDDD3 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of cultural reproduction+ on the domain of cultural reproduction- and on providing linguistically embedded lifeworld resources
-defined: domain of cultural reproduction-
-interpreted, specified and referred to:
-BBBGGGDDD1 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of cultural reproduction- on the domain of normative linguistic articulation and on the domain of individuation/socialization-
-DDDBBBAAACCC2 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of cultural reproduction- on the domain of individuation/socialization+ and on the domain of reproduction of the lifeworld
-DDDFFFEEE3 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of cultural reproduction- on the domain of normative linguistic articulation and on the domain of individuation/socialization-
–reference: In our western world are scientific institutions and products of the sector of technology dominant examples of substantiations of cultural reproduction.
–reference: see DDDGGGBBB
-defined: domain of linguistically embedded lifeworld resources
–interpreted, specified and referred to:
-.FFFGGGCCC1 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of linguistically embedded lifeworld resources on the domain of individuation/socialization+ and on the domain of individuation/socialization-
-FFFAAABBB2 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of linguistically embedded lifeworld resources on the domain of normative linguistic articulation and on the domain of reproduction of the lifeworld
.FFFDDDEEE3 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of linguistically embedded lifeworld resources on the domain of cultural teproduction+ and on the domain of cltural reproduction-
-reference Of course I have here to refer to juridical and political institutions of all kind.
-defined: domain of reproduction of the lifeworld ( = reproduction of the already existing lifeworld into an adapted new state)
-interpreted and specified
-GGGAAAEEE1 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of reproduction of the lifeworld on the domain of cultural reproduction+ and on the domain of cultural reproduction-
-GGGBBBDDD2 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of reproduction of the lifeworld on the domain of cultural reproduction- and normative linguistic articulation and on the domain of providing linguistically embedded lifeworld resources
-GGGFFFCCC3 the aspect of structural deposits of the domain of reproduction of the lifeworld on the domain of normative linguistic articulation and on the domain of linguistically embedded lifeworld resources
–reference: renewing and innovating cultural, linguistic and normative rules in the societal process
5.5 the hybrid character of practices and domains
The societal sectors or domains, represented by the domain-model with seven meaning-dimensions, gain a power of their own that not coincides with the intended social practices of the actors involved. On the one hand, it is characteristic for the societal domains that they are the result of social practices narrowing down options, putting constraints on the appearance and development of social actions. But at the same time they are offering possibilities for new social practices, an invitation for follow ups. These characteristics are an intrinsic part of the lifeworld making linguistic nature of human social interaction. The factual substantiation of social interactions into domains and the intertwinement thereof is historically contingent.
For the understanding of the here proposed differentiation of domains by Habermas, it would be more than helpful to give empirical references for all the differentiated domains and domain-aspects. And for all kind of empirical lifeworld situations. They are needed. More than that, they are required for a correct understanding of the definitions and specifications of the model. I am also quite aware of the fact that they might not be generalizable with regard to societies of other times and in other continents on our planet. And it is obvious that conceptual differentiations in the development of contemporary social sciences ( (broadly speaking the sciences of sociology, law, economics, psychology, anthropology, to name the most prominent ones) bring to the fore the need to reconsider them in the light of Habermas’ conception. In the historical development of the western civilisation the succession of lifeworlds has led to ever more, or in any case, ever weightier domains. In a number of cases this development has led to material substantiations of structural deposits of domains such, that the structural nexus with all the other domains is completely lost out of sight. In the western world is of course an outstanding example of this development the economic domain that has been considered in mainstream economics to be independent of the foundational resources shared with all other domains as designed with Habermas’ model.
6. Provisional conclusion
6.1 In search of a new conception of an interdisciplinary approach
I know that there are numerous attempts to counteract this predicament, and there are a good number of interesting approaches to remedy this situation. Nevertheless I am convinced that in the field of the social sciences we are only in the beginning of gaining insight through in depth empirical analyses into the underlying interconnections between them. They have been obscured through monodisciplinary and hegemonial conceptions thereof.
The main purpose of this paper has been to present for discussion the outline of the process of philosophical modeling that I have been developing in line with Habermas conception of a non-metaphysical philosophy. And at the same time it is an invitation for collaboration adressed to experienced workers in whatever wordly domain, in particular with professionals in the varied fields of the social sciences . To find out together if and how my reconstructive-analytical approach can be made fertile for research-renewal in the social sciences. In this process a well differentiated conceptual apparatus might be quite helpful. This is still an open question, it does however not prevent to go on along the lines sketched in this chapter and to find out, through testing the framework empirically, how far it is applicable.
Every typically human social interaction can only be considered as such when it is possible to show empirically how it integrates the six other practices introduced in Table 6. And only when it is possible to discern them, each with their three differentiated dimensional aspects. And when it is possible to measure and weigh, through apt research-designs for each aspect of the different contributions, to the coming about of a social interaction situation. Today’s dominant existing social disciplines have lost adequately responding to this complexity of real life social interactions. If Habermas approach with the central role of linguistic articulation can be corroborated, then it could well be that we stay before the possibility of a new integrative approach of interdisciplinarity.
In the context of reconstructive philosophizing in line with Habermas’ approach I would have to explicate, that and how highly independently substantiated, historical lifeworld conditions require appropriate interpretations and qualifications. In my reconstructive-analytical project they are guided by the grounding conceptual structure constitutive for human social interaction. It is the common ground of all disciplines and the source of interdisciplinarity. In the context of reconstructive-empirical research they inevitably require also to examine the historical reproduction processes that have led to the (more or less) independent contemporary situation of domains. Each of the domains that we differentiate today have had their own historical path. Habermas has written extensively about the development of the domain of law, making clear that its development is quite different from the development of the domain of politics and of the domain of economics. What they have in common is the grounding conceptual structure laid out with the reconstructive-analytical part of this chapter, but combined with reconstructive-empirical analyses of the contingent conditions that have marked the interaction between the grounding conceptual structure and the contingent historical developments. For each of the contemporary social disciplines has to be articulated how the specified characteristics of the grounding structure have been marked and have been tranformed through the impact of varying societal settings in specific historical conditions.
6.2 Encouraging perspectives
For this discussion it is very encouraging to see how in different social sciences authors as Tomasello (evolutionary anthropologist), Ott and Döhring, Fehr and Frank, Falk , Raworth (economists), Kapferer, Hobart, Napier (cultural anthropologists), among others, are doing work in which investigation of foundational conceptual issues and empirical fieldwork are intimately related. It is beyond any doubt, that for the science of law Habermas’ Faktizität und Geltung (Between Facts and Norms) (1992) is an outstanding example of this renewal of close cooperation between philosophers and social scientists, as well as an important contribution to it.
In a similar line of thinking the amply documented books by Axel Honneth, Das Ich im Wir. Studien zur Anerkennungstheorie (2010) and his, Das Recht der Freiheit (2011); by Bert van Roermund, Legal thought and philosophy (2014) and by Bart Nooteboom, How Markets Work and Fail, and What to Make of Them (2014).
In this regard are from a philosophical point of view the contributions of Heinz Kimmerle and others on ‘intercultural philosophy’ challenging and stimulating. The website of the Foundation for intercultural philosophy and art (www.galerie-inter.de/kimmerle) is a complex and rich resource for Kimmerle’s approach.
My presentation (with this chapter I.7) of the reconstructive -analytical project leaves open an engagement into the required reconstructive-empirical researches. That is beyond my capacities and my actual possibilities. I can only refer to a couple of my attempts to develop a new approach to the problem of interdisciplinarity, mentioning in particular the chapters of this website under the heading: Part II Relevance.
In German: “die über die Grenzen von Methodologie und Wissenschaftstheorie hinaus greift und [….] die Sinnesfundamente der wissenschaftlichen Theoriebildung in der vorwissenschaftlichen Praxis freilegt”, Nachmetaphysisches Denken, tome I., p.57. I do not have access to a published English translation.
2. I use the term ‘reconstructive’ in the same sense as Habermas (cf. my paper ‘Kommunikatief handelen, zelfreflectie en rationele reconstructie’ (1978) (transl. Communicative action, self-reflection and rational reconstruction) on my website www.fransvandoorne.nl, under the heading Reconstruction I.1
3. P.H.M.Ruys, professor emeritus of mathematical economics at Tilburg university, who designed the tripolar interaction model in his dissertation: Public goods and decentralization: the duality approach in the theory of value (1974).I have developed my philosophical interpretation in a longstanding stimulating dialogue with him. See Van Doorne/Ruys 1984 (in German), where one can find also a short mathematical construction of the tripolar model, p. 208-214. In a long commentary on the recent translation of the classical text The case of the Speluncian Explorers of L. Fuller: De zaak van de grotverkenners (2021) argues Bert van Roermund in favor of the use of modeling in the social science of law, p.75-84. In my opinion is his argumentation relevant for all the social sciences.
4. To this interpretation of duality I have been inspired not only by Ruys, but very much also by (Shotter 1983): “The concept of duality of structures is designed to play an important role (…). It refers to the fact that it is structured both as a product and as a process. And the significance of this is that, when linked to the concept of intentionality, it explains how human action can, in the course of its own performance, provide itself with the conditions for its own continuation. In other words, by acting we can create the conditions for further action. (…) Due to its ability to produce in its wake, so to speak, a structured context for its own continuation, an action can be informed, not so much by factors present in the source from which it issues, as by the context into which it is directed. It is this view which will be developed below.” I replace the link that Shotter makes to the concept of intentionality by a link to the Habermasian concept of social interaction, and I am discussing here semantic and pragmatic matters and not actual actions. Nevertheless, in my view is what he says about the duality of actual human actions applicable to the relation between the semantic, resp. pragmatic meaning-components and the semantic , resp. pragmatic meaning-dimensions.
5. For the importance of the concept language see my: The Categorical Framework of Habermas’ Theory of Society and the Key Role of Language,cf. this website: www.fransvandoorne.nl, under the heading Reconstruction I.6. For this topic are the first and the third chapter of Habermas’ Vom Sinnlichen Eindruck zum symbolischen Ausdruck (1996) very clarifying. Language is the key force in the interlocking relations of social practices, producing time and again social lifeworlds, and on another conceptual level, in the societal reproduction of existing lifeworlds. As such is language a constitutive structuring pre-condition of whatever form of human social interaction and as such intimately related to the lifeworld concept.With regard to contemporary social and societal interactions, and given the research areas Habermas has been working on (in particular sociology, law and politics ), the term ‘linguistic’ is more appropiate than ‘symbolic embodying’ for a discussion of performative models. And in this context its use refers principally, although not exclusively, to grammatical language.
I can not expand here on this important issue for Habermas’ theory of communicative action, but to realize its importance one should read Habermas’ Nachmetaphysisches Denken, tome I, p.51-60, and tome II (2012): the ‘Preface’ (that is much more than a preface !), and the first three chapters of this tome II.
6. On this level of reconstructive explication ingenious research-designs can open paths for empirical scrutiny of all the (21 !) specified aspects of social practices. And, not less important, it is possible through appropriate empirical specifications to measure and count their respective stretch and weight. It is here that qualitative and quantitative research have to be intertwined.
7.For the topic of individuation/socialization practices I like to recommend the new essay of Cynthia Fleury, philosophe and psychiatrist, Les Irremplacables (reviewed in Liberation, 3 sept.2015, p.30). In this review it is refered to as an in depth analysis and critique of current individualism. To quote just one characterisation of her essay (found on www.lesinrocks.com): ‘Cynthia Fleury rappelle que seule l’individuation- et non l’individualisme-protège la democratie en son coeur. La notion d’individuation fait echo à celle d’individualisme, mais pour la critiquer au fond, et rappeler q’un individu dans un Etat de droit doit pouvoir devenir ‘sujet’ ’.
8. Reading these days about Cl. Lefort’s concept ‘empty space’ (in: Claude Lefort, Wat is politiek) I am struck by the comparability of his concept with the unsurmountable ambiguity that is at the core of Habermas’conception of social interaction.Recently (2016) a doctoral thesis has been defended at Louvain university the conclusion of which goes into the same direction: Wai Ch’un Leong, Triangulation, Thought and Joint Commitment: A Joint Commitment Account of the Objectivity of Thought.9. For these aspects of practices of linguistic embodiment, Object-relation theories and underlying conceptions and data in the field of family-system therapy, have to offer very interesting approaches.
10.Tomasello speaks in his (2003,) p.241 of : ‘joint attentional frames’. I like to quote him here (Tomasello): “…in referring and predicating speakers must – mainly in terms of their current knowledge and expectations always make sure that the symbols and constructions they use are tailored, more or less precisely, to the communicative needs of their listener in the current joint attentional frame. Languages have many different kinds of conventional means for accomplishing these acts of communicative grounding.” Quite interesting to note how Tomasello brings together the joint attentional frames with communicative needs and communicative grounding through conventional means.
11. I am quite aware of the fact that the here presented differentiation of domains might not be generalizable with regard to societies of other times and in other continents on our planet. It is obvious that conceptual differentiations in the development of contemporary social sciences bring to the fore the need to reconsider the conceptual framework of domains put forward here.
Note: this list includes the references for the papers published as number I.5 and I.6 on this website under the heading I.Reconstruction.
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